These historical truths, contain the groundwork of the national union; and, as historical truths, they cannot, according to their nature, be received otherwise than on trust; authority alone gives them the necessary evidence. And they were, moreover, confirmed to the nation by miracles, and supported by an authority which sufficed to place faith beyond all doubt and hesitation."
This is from Moses Mendelssohn's Jerusalem, full quotation here. Your questions are due by THURSDAY, October 21, at 11:59pm. I have changed the time to accommodate your college apps.
Thank you, to all who have posted so far. Due to the lecture tonight, I'm more than willing to accept re-writes or submissions until Sunday evening at 11:59pm.
I want to focus on one passage towards the end that I thought was somewhat surprising. Mendelssohn wrote, "As directions to general practice, and rules of conduct, both the written and unwritten laws have public and private happiness for their immediate object. But they must also be mostly considered as a mode of writing; and as ceremonial laws, there is no sense and meaning in them."
ReplyDeleteIt would seem from this passage that Mendelssohn believes the essential goal of the Mitzvot and of a Halachic lifestyle is personal and communal happiness. The Mitzvot, in other words, are a system of practices designed to make people truly happy. What is happiness? Is it a better society in which people act altruistically, selflessly, and with the interests of everyone at heart? This may be Utopia, but is it happiness? The dictionary definition of the English word happiness (which is probably different from the original German word) is good fortune; pleasure; contentment; joy (dictionary.com). Did Mendelssohn intend any of these meanings? Was Mendelssohn’s version of happiness simply joy or mere contentment? It surprises me that Mendelssohn apparently believes the immediate goal of the Mitzvot is to make individuals and society happy. A more traditional view of the Mitzvot is that we do as God commands, and better ourselves and others through the performance of these laws. In the Torah, there are many rewards listed for doing the Mitzvot, but I’m pretty sure God didn’t say “happiness” was the reason he gave us the Torah. Mendelssohn may only be referring to the laws dealing with general conduct, but I’m not even sure those laws were given so that we would be “happy”.
I am also surprised with Mendelssohn’s trivialization of “ceremonial laws”, which he appears to claim have no intrinsic meaning. He goes on to write how ritual law served to unite practice with doctrine, encourage student-teacher bonds, and provide a source for emulation. I am surprised he doesn’t find any intrinsic, or at least symbolic, meaning in the ritual/ceremonial aspects of Jewish law. Does he in fact believe the ritual aspects of Judaism only serve these external purposes and are not rewarded by God or have any spiritual significance? Does he believe at all in spirituality, or is he a complete rationalist? Does he believe in Olam Habbah (afterlife) or in spiritual reward for the performance of the Mitzvot, or were they merely given to us to make us a happier society?
"These historical truths, contain the groundwork of the national union; and, as historical truths, they cannot, according to their nature, be received otherwise than on trust; authority alone gives them the necessary evidence." - In other words, these historical truths, aka, "accounts of the occurrences of the primitive world" cannot be questioned because there is no way to know if they are indeed true. We must rely solely on faith and on trust. How scholarly and dependable was Moses Mendelssohn? Aren't we all taught sense birth that we should ask questions about what we are following? Are we not taught in lower,middle, and upper school that there are documented proofs and quotes in the books of the Torah? When Mendelssohn made this claim I think he may have made it a bit hastily. If he is writing a passage on Jewish faith in order so that others will understand the ways of our "traditions" shouldn't he have corresponded his work with what the Jewish people do (question everything)? Are we wrong in that we question everything? Should we just except that we will never understand and just have 100% faith in God? Or was Mendelssohn wrong in writing that we must only go on faith?
ReplyDeleteI was reading an article on the life of Moses Mendelssohn and came across a very interesting point. "Having been taught that there is no absolutely true religion, Mendelssohn's own descendants -- a brilliant circle, of which the musician Felix was the most noted -- left the Synagogue for the Church." His own descendants left Judaism for Christianity because they weren't taught a singal true religion. Earlier in the article, it say "The excitement caused by these proceedings led Mendelssohn to publish his most important contribution to the problems connected with the position of Judaism in relation to the general life." Now, if this book written by Moses Mendelssohn was talking about the position in Judaism in relation to the general life, then why one of his descendants convert to Christianity? What happened behind the scenes that made seven of Moses Medelssohn's descendants Christian?
ReplyDeleteHere is the site: http://www.nndb.com/people/141/000093859/
-Aaron Zuckerman
Jerusalem was written by Moses Mendelssohn to explain his idea of Judaism and to make it appeal the state to be a religion respected just like all the others. Moses does a good job of explaining the dynamic of the religion by writing about our faith, our history and the impact Judaism has on our daily lives. I agree with everything that Moses writes except for one thing. Moses says “These historical truths, contain the groundwork of the national union; and, as historical truths, they cannot, according to their nature, be received otherwise than on trust” The nature of truth regards facts and actuality so how can a truth be trusted? Trust is what one has in something that is not factual or that cannot be proven, (unlike a truth which, by definition, has been proven actual.) Trust is what we have that pushes us to take the leap of faith that is necessary for Judaism. These “historical truths” that Moses Mendelssohn calls the “groundwork of the national union” aren’t really truths, they’re stories and traditions that have been passed down that we believe, or trust, as part of our religion. Was Moses using the word “truth” to give Judaism more of a legitimate, solid ground than it actually has?
ReplyDelete“But they must also be mostly considered as a mode of writing; and as ceremonial laws, there is no sense and meaning in them”
ReplyDeleteMoses Mendelssohn grew up poor. Is it possible that since his family could never afford to do the ceremonial laws such as Passover, Succoth, etc. so grew to hate them? Couldn’t it be that he resented all the Jews with enough money to perform them? Then in his later years, unconsciously, wrote that they are unimportant, and focused on mitzvoth being necessary and important, because even he, a poor lad, could perform them.
Additionally, Couldn’t it be that he wanted to show that having money isn’t a necessity in Judaism, so he discredited the ceremonial laws on the basis that many of them cost money to perform?
In the beginning when he writes "according to the founder's design", how does Moshe Mendelson support his claim to know and understand what this "founder" meant? Also who exactly is he referring to? Moshe or God? or someone else entirely?
ReplyDeletePlain and simple, this is a historical criticism. It is stating that the Bible is not necessarily of divine origin, and the only reason we follow the religion is based on trust. Mendelssohn is often referred to as “The Father of the Reform Movement”, despite Mr. Williams’ objections, and I believe this is part of the reason. Not because of this seemingly blasphemous rejection of the Bible and its divine origin, but because this criticism goes right along with what the rest of culture was doing at this time.
ReplyDeleteThis sort of historical criticism gained popularity, or notoriety depending on your point of view, during the mid-18th century, not coincidentally when Mendelssohn lived. What was Mendelssohn’s goal in writing this? Was it to help his own Jewish faith, and the faith of those around him, or to fit in better with his Christian contemporaries?
If Moses Mendelssohn said, that the historical truths "cannot, according to their nature, be received otherwise than on trust; authority alone gives them the necessary evidence", than why is he deciding to change the lifestyle observant Judaism requires? If these historical truths (assuming he means the historical figures that did observe the laws of the Torah) are meant to be trusted because they are under an authority, than why change their format? Why read the Torah more as a history book rather than a guide to a particular lifestyle?
ReplyDeleteRose L.
"Now I am able to concentrate my ideas of Judaism of former times, and bring them under one focus."
ReplyDeleteOne of the first questions I would ask is, what was his preface prior to this passage? He's writing in historical context "forefathers", what application did this have contemporary to his time?
In "Jerusalem", Mendelssohn quotes Herr Moerschel who states to "acknowledge no immutable truths, but such as not only may be made conceivable to the human understanding, but as also admit of being demonstrated and warranted by human faculties". Mendelssohn goes on to defend Judaism by explaining that it is not a "revealed religion" nor does it coerce its followers to accept "dogmas" or "saving truths" based off of written or spoken word. Rather, as is the way with the rest of mankind, these "immutable truths" are given to rational consideration through nature and events. Nevertheless, Mendelssohn does not deny Judaism's divine revelation. He believes, Judaism's revelation is done through the peculiar laws that it is given by G-D miraculously.
ReplyDeleteIn addition to believing in the accessibility and rational footing for Judaism's "Immutable Truths", Mendelssohn acknowledges the rationality and purpose behind Jewish rules of conduct in furthering individual (and public) happiness. Why then were Judaism's non-ceremonial laws given through divine revelation if, according to him, matters which can be explained through nature do not depend on written word? Why are Halachot like "Thou Shalt Not Kill" or "Though Shalt not Steal" contained within G-D's unique revelation to His People ("God, as Lord Protector and ally of their forefathers") if these are arguably rational laws that apply to everyone? Did he believe otherwise-that only Jews have such obligations? If so, how would he explain the origins of moral codes which are found outside of Judaism as well (and even within the Hammurabi Code)? Would he say they are different? If so, in what ways?
And if, indeed, he believes non-rational laws apply to all people, then does he believe that the only things which preserve Jewish distinction are its "senseless" ceremonial laws- explicitly because they are impervious to rational explanation? Do they then take on a much greater value if viewed as Judaism's solitary distinction? Moreover, what happens when these ceremonial laws can no longer be properly observed because of times of "folly" or "ignorance"? If they can't be observed properly (and we hold by the premise that non-ceremonial laws apply to all), then what makes Judaism distinct? Would he argue that there's some middle ground between the extreme irrational ceremonial laws (that have come to be abused) and the rational laws which apply to all- that maintain Judaism's distinctiveness? Or would he argue that in those times, Judaism would in fact no longer retain it's peculiar status?
Finally, what does Mendelssohn mean when he states ceremonial laws have degenerated because of "human folly" and "ignorance"? Is this on an individual or national level? Is it still possible for some people within Judaism to maintain the essence of these ceremonial laws or has it been lost on a national level? What has caused this degeneration? Is there any way to return to the proper way of performing these obligations? Would believe that ceremonial laws continue to suffer from these exact issues even today? Is it possible that he would consider different Jewish communities (and sects) to vary in their ability to fully grasp ceremonial laws?
In "Jerusalem", Mendelssohn quotes Herr Moerschel who states to "acknowledge no immutable truths, but such as not only may be made conceivable to the human understanding, but as also admit of being demonstrated and warranted by human faculties". Mendelssohn goes on to defend Judaism by explaining that it is not a "revealed religion" nor does it coerce its followers to accept "dogmas" or "saving truths" based off of written or spoken word. Rather, as is the way with the rest of mankind, these "immutable truths" are given to rational consideration through nature and events. Mendelssohn does not, however, deny Judaism's divine revelation. Rather, he believes, Judaism's revelation is done through its peculiar G-D given laws.
ReplyDeleteIn addition to believing in the accessibility and rational footing for Judaism's "Immutable Truths", Mendelssohn acknowledges the rationality and purpose behind Jewish rules of conduct in furthering individual (and public) happiness. Why then were Judaism’s non-ceremonial laws given through divine revelation if, according to him, matters which can be explained through nature do not depend on written word? Why are Halachot like "Thou Shalt Not Kill" or "Though Shalt not Steal" contained within G-D's unique revelation to His People ("God, as Lord Protector and ally of their forefathers") if these are arguably rational laws that apply to everyone? Did he believe otherwise-that only Jews have such obligations? If so, how would he explain the origins of moral codes which are found outside of Judaism as well, like Hamurabi or any of civilization’s Justice systems? Would he say they are different? If so, in what ways? Would he argue they are all modeled off of Judaism?
And if, indeed, he believes non-rational laws apply to all people, then are the "senseless" ceremonial laws the only things which preserve Jewish distinction - explicitly because they are impervious to rational explanation? Moreover, what happens when these ceremonial laws can no longer be properly observed during times of "folly" or "ignorance"? If they truly can't be observed properly (and we still hold by the premise that non-ceremonial laws apply to all), then what makes Judaism distinct any longer? Would he argue that there's some middle ground between the extreme irrational ceremonial laws (that have come to be abused) and the rational laws which apply to all- that maintain Judaism's distinctiveness? Or would he perhaps argue that in such times, Judaism would in fact no longer retain its peculiar status?
Finally, what does Mendelssohn mean when he states ceremonial laws have degenerated because of "human folly" and "ignorance"? Is this on an individual or national level? What has caused this degeneration? Is there any way to return to the proper way of performing these obligations? Would believe that ceremonial laws continue to suffer from these exact issues even today? Is it still possible for some Jews in a generation of ignorance to maintain the essence of these ceremonial laws? Similarly, is it possible that Mendelssohn would consider different Jewish communities (and sects) today to vary in their ability to fully grasp ceremonial laws?
Throughout the whole work Mendelssohn speaks positively about the Jewish religion. Until literally the last sentence of the quote, he says something out of place. "The ceremonial law was to offer inducements to personal intercourse and social connexion between the school and the professor, the inquirer and the instructor, and to excite and encourage com- petition and emulation; and that purpose it actually did answer in the first times, before the polity degenerated, and human folly again intermeddled to change, by ignorance and misguidance, good to evil, and the bene ficial to the hurtful." What is he reffering to, when he says "before the polity degenerated, and human folly again intermeddled to change." It sounds almost like he is taking a shot at the rabbinical authority. Is this assumption accurate? If so, why would he say such a thing in a work commending Judaism?
ReplyDeleteMendelssohn starts this segment of jerusalem by focusing the reader on Judaism of former times. This piece seems to be focused only on judaism of the past and on nothing present. Mendelssohn criticizes the faith above all else concept that presided over judaism of the past. This criticism claims that faith from miracles is unfounded and not strong enough to continue this faith nowadays. Given this assumption, why does Mendelssohn have a problem with miracle based faith, and if this faith is not good enough, how should a modern jew find faith in god through a jewish lense?
ReplyDeleteHow can the nation have faith from an authority member? God is inanimate, he is beyond our realm. what about these authority members gave the nation the confidence and trust? What was the necessary evidence that they had back then? So we as a nation today can have that same trust.
ReplyDeleteSeeing as many of the great questions have been asked I've decided to get crafty. Mendelsohn writes "Judaism consisted, or, according to the founder's design was to consist of:" read this line carefully. Focus on this line "or, according to the founder's design was to". He doubles back on himself changing what he said. He says "was to" as if to say it now does not. What does Moses Mendelssohn think Judaism consist of? What do you, personally, think Judaism is to consist of?
ReplyDelete